The Rise of a Post-Soviet Oligarch
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine and Georgia entered a period of widespread privatization and economic liberalization. The Soviet command economy was dismantled, and state holdings were sold for pennies. The IMF, Western banks, and other large foreign bureaucracies played a crucial role in this process, urging the establishment of policies that would reduce the state’s role and make room for private enterprise, often in partnership with the emerging post-Soviet elites. As a prominent figure among this new elite, the Ukrainian-Israeli oligarch Igor Kolomoisky capitalized on the chaos, consolidating former state resources to establish a vast business empire in the vacuum left by the Soviet system’s collapse. Today, Kolomoisky’s role in both Ukraine and Georgia illustrates the transactional and self-serving nature of the liberal economic reform programs. In Ukraine, his dramatic fall from grace at the hands of foreign bureaucracies has left him vilified as a symbol of oligarchic corruption. Meanwhile, in Georgia, despite his history of labor abuses and exploitation, Kolomoisky is shielded by his status as a foreign investor, dodging accountability. This contradiction highlights the pathological framing of Eastern European corruption by external actors, where “reforms”—whether privatization, nationalization, or direct intervention—are selectively applied to serve geopolitical and economic interests rather than to promote consistent values of democracy or anti-corruption.
Kolomoisky, born in Dnipro, Ukraine, rose to prominence as a steel baron in the 1990s. By the early 2000s, he had reassembled parts of the old Soviet ferroalloy and metal production supply chain, acquiring some of the Soviet Union’s most productive manganese mines, located across the Black Sea in the former Georgian Soviet Republic. Manganese is crucial for producing metal alloys, and by acquiring Georgian Manganese, Kolomoisky effectively rebuilt the once-efficient vertical integration of alloy metal production between Georgian mines and Ukrainian mills. With additional holdings in the US and Australia, Kolomoisky’s Privat Group is said to have controlled as much as 30–40% of global ferroalloy production at its peak, making him one of Ukraine’s richest and most influential oligarchs.
The blurring of lines between private and public sectors through extra-democratic influence is a defining characteristic of oligarchical rule. In Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics, the fluid boundaries between national and commercial control are one way oligarchs compete for power. Kolomoisky and others accumulate wealth not only through privatization but also by leveraging political connections to shape state policy. This means that the distinction between state and non-state influence is often superficial, as the super-rich oligarchs exert pressure on the government through control of media holdings, sponsorship of political campaigns, outright graft, and renegade violence. Similarly, state institutions, unable to resist oligarchic influence, are often hijacked and used as tools in power struggles between oligarchs. These individuals move seamlessly between commanding business empires and engaging in politics, often directly to expand their power and gain an advantage over rivals.
Kolomoisky exemplified this dynamic when he was appointed governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in March 2014—a position he secured through his immense wealth and influence—after Viktor Yanukovych was ousted following popular uprisings calling for closer ties to the West. Amid the chaos of Yanukovych’s departure, Russian-backed separatists entered Eastern Ukraine, acting as proxies in an oligarchic turf war during the power vacuum in Ukrainian leadership. Russian oligarchs, supported by the Russian government, bankrolled separatist movements and began seizing resources and business holdings in the region. Sensing a threat to his empire, Kolomoisky leveraged his wealth and business network to form the Dnipro Battalion, a volunteer militia created in April 2014. Initially composed of 500–1000 fighters, the battalion was trained in camps near Dnipro and funded primarily through Kolomoisky’s private resources, including his media empire and business interests. While that may not seem like a large number in the context of the full-scale war now raging between Russia and Ukraine, in the wake of the 2014 revolution, Ukraine was reported to have fewer than 7000 combat-ready soldiers in its entire army. While the Dnipro Battalion and Kolomoisky’s actions as governor were presented as patriotic efforts to defend Ukrainian sovereignty, they also served to safeguard his business empire, ensuring his holdings remained secure as Russian competitors waged open warfare for control of territory within Ukraine.
A Powerful Intermediary Becomes Expendable
However, Kolomoisky’s fortunes began to shift with Ukraine’s rapid pivot toward the West following the 2014 revolution and the outbreak of the war in Donbas.
Kolomoisky had previously enjoyed cordial relationships with Russian businesses and oligarchs, but in July 2014 the Russian state issued an arrest warrant related to his sponsorship of Dnipro Battalion. By 2015, Russian proxies in the East had transcended the opportunism of the interregnum and were reframing the invasion in increasingly manichean terms. The Russian state, sensing it had struck political gold, leaned heavily into the narrative of a Russian holy war against Ukraine and the West, excluding any future possibility of Kolomoisky collaborating with any Russia-aligned groups.
On the Ukrainian side, newly elected president Petro Poroshenko, another powerful Ukrainian oligarch, removed Kolomoisky from his position as governor of Dnipropetrovsk in 2015. This led to an open feud between the two, with Kolomoisky publicly criticizing the government and attempting to undermine Poroshenko’s authority.
Among the Ukrainian population, Kolomoisky’s favourability was also waning. While his early resistance to Russian encroachment earned him popularity across the country, his subsequent actions and the unraveling of his corruption schemes eliminated any goodwill he may have accrued.
Kolomoisky was now encircled from all sides. To the Ukrainian government, he was a competitor to and enemy of President Poroshenko. From the Russian side, Kolomoisky’s actions in support of Ukrainian resistance made him a terrorist. On the domestic popular front, he was increasingly viewed as a vestige of a corrupt and dying system. Finally, Western neoliberal bureaucracies were preparing to launch their own assault through the top-down restructuring of the Ukrainian economy, with Kolomoisky’s dubious business practices coming under investigation worldwide.
The new Ukrainian government, facing an economic crisis, was desperate for funding and accepted billions in new IMF loans along with further billions of other foreign loans. Kolomoisky, owner of Ukraine’s largest commercial bank, PrivatBank, found himself in the spotlight. Corrupt ownership practices at the banking giant had left a more than $5-billion hole in PrivatBank’s balance sheet.
The IMF insisted that the new government nationalize the under-capitalized PrivatBank as a condition for new loans. At first glance, nationalization might seem out of character for the ostensibly “free-market” mission of the IMF; however, if one looks beyond the catch-phrases and free-market dogma, the IMF nationalization of PrivatBank is congruent to their historical motives. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western capitalist forces largely stood by while oligarchs took warlord-like control of public holdings. In this chaotic environment, oligarchs were allowed to grow their empires unchecked, with outside interests playing a passive role, essentially collecting tribute by making deals with the new oligarchical elite of the post-Soviet order and exporting profits. For a time, this suited the interests of Western powers, who viewed this tribute-taking arrangement as a profitable stabilizing force. However, as these same interests sought to expand more directly into new markets, they moved to reshape the system. Ukraine, one of the westernmost among the post-Soviet countries and second only to Russia in GDP, would move from the “wild east” to the west, trading the primitive mafia management of the oligarchs for the sophisticated bureaucratic rule of corporate finance. By leveraging IMF loan conditions, outside interests sought to exert control over the government itself, facilitating the development of a corporate financial environment that marginalized the oligarchs. This new system of corporate bureaucracy was designed to smooth out inefficiencies, essentially squeezing out the oligarch middlemen like Kolomoisky and ensuring that the flow of wealth and control was more directly managed by global investors and financial institutions. Kolomoisky’s role was transformed from a convenient intermediary to an unnecessary expenditure.
The costs of the IMF loans issued to Ukraine during its most vulnerable period stacked up quickly for the Ukrainian people: the removal of price controls on heating oil and gas sent ordinary Ukrainians’ bills soaring in the middle of a war and economic crisis, with price increases nearing as much as 300%. Later, in 2017, only 20% of Ukrainians supported an IMF-backed land reform law that would open Ukraine’s agricultural market to large international investors, yet the law was passed anyway due to IMF threats to withhold future loans. Ukraine’s pension and other entitlement systems came under fire as well.
Despite the damage done by IMF reforms and specific public opposition to many of its policies, the western direction of Ukrainian state policy remained popular. The subconscious ego of pro-Western Ukraine might, at times, be characterized as a preference for the stable hand of authoritarian Western bureaucrats over the raucous domination of mafia-like oligarchs—a system for which Kolomoisky was emblematic.
The nationalization of PrivatBank was carried out, and Kolomoisky’s ouster was heralded as the christening of a new era of anti-corruption and de-oligarchization. Kolomoisky, a dual Ukrainian-Israeli citizen, fled to Israel, where his wealth and investments have afforded him considerable influence. (Perhaps more pertinently, Israel famously refuses to extradite its citizens for foreign crimes, except in extreme cases.) Kolomoisky retained power over his Ukrainian business and media empire and attempted to push back against his ouster. In 2019, he threw his support behind political outsider Volodymyr Zelensky in the race for President of Ukraine. Zelensky defeated Kolomoisky’s adversary and fellow oligarch Petro Poroshenko in a landslide election victory. However, Kolomoisky soon found himself in practical exile under Zelensky as well. With Kolomoisky’s corrupt business practices under scrutiny across the globe, Zelensky cut ties and revoked his citizenship under a Ukrainian law banning dual citizenship and upheld the nationalization of PrivatBank in the face of Kolomoisky’s legal challenges. Kolomoisky remained in hiding in Israel for years until his return to Ukraine and subsequent arrest after the full-scale invasion in 2022. He remains in detention to this day.
The Exploitation Behind Kolomoisky’s Georgian Business Empire
So what, then, of Kolomoisky’s Georgian business empire, owned and controlled through his US-based proxy company, Georgian American Manganese? Throughout its existence, Georgian American Manganese has faced persistent accusations of exploitative practices, labor violations, ecological damage, and mismanagement—particularly following the weakening of labor protections and collective bargaining rights that characterized Georgia’s post-Soviet liberalization. Meanwhile, the Georgian government has positioned itself as a haven for foreign investment, touting a commitment to laissez-faire economic policies—policies that, like those in Ukraine, have been heavily influenced and shaped by outside financiers and bureaucracies.
The ruling Georgian Dream political party, founded by Georgia’s only billionaire oligarch, Bidzina Ivanishvili, has undoubtedly been closely watching the fate of Ihor Kolomoisky. The ease with which Western influence dismantled Kolomoisky’s business empire in the wake of the Euromaidan revolution likely raised alarm bells for Ivanishvili. This may have prompted his party to shift its rhetoric from a liberal European message to one of nativist sovereignty, stoking fears of Western interlopers and outsiders.
While launching polemics against the so-called “global party of war” and decrying the influence of the Western NGO industrial complex on local Georgian politics, Ivanishvili and the Georgian Dream have remained remarkably accommodating to foreign investment, regardless of its destructive impact on Georgian workers. The controversial “foreign influence law” passed in 2023 requires NGOs receiving foreign funding to register as “agents of a foreign power,” yet such demands are conspicuously absent when it comes to foreign business entities. Behind closed doors, Georgian Dream has signed and defended numerous large foreign investment schemes, including corrupt and potentially illegal deals involving Turkish investment in hydropower and attempts to sell off significant swaths of nature reserves to private investors with ties to Russia.
The same deference has been granted to Kolomoisky himself, despite his status as a pariah in Ukraine, North America, Russia, and elsewhere. The Georgian government has overlooked his destructive management of Georgian natural resources and abuses of workers.
In 2019, strikes and protests by miners led to some gains for workers, following numerous fatalities and ongoing complaints. In 2023, victims of Georgian Manganese’s environmental destruction staged further protests, with arrests, beatings, and violence used against protesters and workers. In February and March of 2025, miners in Chiatura organized additional protests against the recent temporary closure of the mine by Georgian Manganese, a move threatening the livelihoods of the entire region. While Georgian Manganese claims the closure is due to falling manganese prices and the high cost of underground mining, protesters suspect part of the intent is to inflict economic hardship on workers who have long fought for improved conditions and greater oversight of the company. At the same time, Georgian Manganese has been pursuing new leases from the government for strip mining—a much more environmentally damaging process that employs fewer workers and has lower overhead. In 2021, the Georgian government completed a new road to the remote village of Shkhmeri. Soon after, proposals for open-pit manganese mining within the natural and historic zone followed, prompting protests from local villagers.
Georgian Dream’s Selective Outrage
Investments like the new road to the remote village of Shkhmeri prove the government is ready to subsidize the mining industry’s most destructive practices, but unwilling to lift a finger to protect miners from the predatory behavior of foreign-owned mining companies like Georgian Manganese.
Protesters have recently sought the nationalization of the mining enterprise owned by Kolomoisky, with a policy of reinvesting profits into the local community instead of exporting them abroad. However, thus far, the Georgian government has been unresponsive to calls for action to protect the future of these mining towns from predatory interlopers. The response of Georgia’s ruling party to the abuses of Georgian workers at Georgian Manganese—that it is a “private matter” in which the government should not intervene—is clearly aimed at maintaining foreign investor confidence, signaling Georgia’s openness to global investment and its deference to the free market.
The Georgian Dream has made headlines in recent years for its staunchly nationalistic, pro-sovereignty message, defying the influence of foreign NGOs and bureaucracies from the West. The US has recently threatened to sanction Ivanishvili and other key members of the Georgian Dream government, accusing them of subverting Georgian Democracy. Despite the public feud between the liberal western bureaucracies and the Georgian government, the government’s actions in Chiatura and elsewhere show they have no issue with pro-market, anti-labor exploitation of Georgian people by foreign capital.
The irony is striking: The U.S. sanctions Kolomoisky, accusing him of lobbying violations, and the IMF nationalizes his bank in Ukraine due to mismanagement. Meanwhile, the Georgian government decries the dangers of foreign influence, yet continues to protect the toxic business practices of Kolomoisky’s U.S.-based proxies, who control one of Georgia’s most valuable national resources. Then, the US threatens to sanction Georgian Dream’s leadership— not for enabling oligarchic control over the economy and damaging the livelihoods of Georgian people, but for defying the power of western bureaucracies to unilaterally decide how and where Georgian people will be exploited.
Likewise, the absence of outrage over Kolomoisky’s activities in Georgia contrasts sharply with the response to his actions in Ukraine. This inconsistency highlights a double standard in how Western-backed institutions like the IMF and governments choose to target oligarchs: when their activities align with Western geopolitical or economic interests, they are allowed to continue unchecked. But when they are seen as obstructing the interests of Western investment, they are swiftly destroyed. Ivanishvili and the Georgian Dream have learned a lesson from Kolomoisky’s dramatic downfall during Ukraine’s Western shift and voiced a legitimate criticism of the West’s self-serving “reform” programs—unfortunately, the lesson they have learned is only about protecting their own right to profit from the exploitation of Georgian workers.
Ryan Christopher is a pseudonym for an American-born environmental activist living in Georgia and Ukraine for the past decade.