Germany faces its deepest political and economic crisis since reunification. The economy has not recovered from the pandemic, class stratification has deepened (almost one fifth of residents are on the brink of or below the poverty line), while increasing numbers mistrust democratic institutions, and authoritarian, extreme right-wing positions have become normalized. The late February parliamentary elections took place because the so-called Ampel (traffic light) coalition of the “red” SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Social Democratic Party of Germany) PM Olaf Scholz, the pro-war Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), and the neoliberal (yellow) FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei, Free Democratic Party) received a vote of non-confidence in December of last year.
In the current climate, it cannot be even slightly surprising that the electoral campaign and media reduced public discussion to three major topics that had long been pushed by the far-right AfD (Alternative für Deutschland, Alternative for Germany): migration (how to close the borders?), war/security (how to arm ourselves as much as possible?), and the slowing of the economic growth (that is, the falling profit rate of big capital). Needless to say, the last government deserves criticism, but not along the lines voiced by mainstream parties. Also, thanks to the Ampel coalition, German political space has moved to openly anti-ecological, pro-war, and neoliberal positions, continuing to dismantle the welfare state and to follow the dictates of US policy. This media climate was enhanced by the recent victorious march to power of Trump and Musk.
Under these conditions, nobody expected anything other than electoral victory for the hard right. This is what happened last Sunday. With a high turnout (83%, the largest since reunification), Germany embraced a course towards the right (CDU [Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany] and AfD receiving 50% of the vote), with a small positive movement to the left as well, with Die Linke (The Left) scoring 9% of the vote. This prompted some liberal pundits to speak about the polarization of the German political landscape, as if we now need to deal with the extremists on left and right. They forgot to add that the extreme right has been long normalized, while the so-called extreme left’s reformist positions are barely tolerated by the media. Another alleged polarization is presented in the supposed alternative between conservative CDU/CSU and the AfD, where the former West is allegedly still led by CDU “democrats” while the former East is led by “extremists,” AfD. These pundits do not want to recognize the fact that the today’s CDU is only a more acceptable form of AfD for Western Germany.
Merz’s conservative CDU/CSU, which caters to the interests of capital and seems to offer stability, won 28.5%. The result is its second worst ever; meanwhile, the neo-fascist AfD scored 20.5%. Among AfD’s new MPs, there will be not only a large majority of older white men but also a large portion of MPs who come from the police, the army, and the repressive apparatus. This, to put it mildly, brings quite a few chilling historical comparisons. The AfD has doubled its votes, and has already managed to decide substantive issues without being in government. We can expect the same now that the not-so-tacit sharing of political power continues. The ideological vanguard of AfD, facilitated by the media, will be complemented by the executive-political power of the CDU/CSU. The former social contract had been shattered by neoliberalism (under the watch of the SPD and Greens two decades ago), while the so-called centrist political compromise was shattered more recently by neofascist advance, from Trump to AfD, and an increasingly pro-war climate. The latter is finally putting an end to the Brandmauer (firewall), the Cold War policy of the center designed to safeguard capitalist democracy by isolating the extreme left and right.
In the current climate of far-right ascendancy, the dominant center-right parties have used this banner to prevent any party from forming coalitions with AfD. This policy functioned, I would argue, not to strengthen any emancipatory promise or real democracy, but as a “feel good” vibe that consolidates the center and organizes a few performative protests to show the strength of Brandmauer. By now it should be clear that the Brandmauer existed only for naive minds and that the division of power has been laid, namely in the ideological vanguard of AfD led by CDU/CSU in this constellation, with some crumbs reserved for SPD (and less often to the Greens). What is more dangerous is that AfD will still present itself as an oppositional party—the loudest and most promoted, even if negatively, by the mainstream media. In fact, in terms of ruling class interest, AfD will not play any sort of opposition but will only be radicalizing the existing destructive tendencies in order to win the next elections.
In the moment of the wedding between financial capital and (far-)right political forces, the imperial project is comfortably back in the central seat. MAGA will be joined by MEGA: Make Europe Great Again! It remains open what the positioning of financial capital and political leadership will be vis-a-vis the US, Russia, and China. What is clear is that they will be all promoting European unity based on militarization and austerity. In Germany, we have been witnessing a rehearsal for future attacks and repression of any real alternative. In the past year we have seen many targeted attacks on the left, on migrant and critical cultural and intellectual groups and formations. Throughout the last year, numerous instances of disciplining and sanctioning of the Pro-Palestinian movement, and cancellations and defunding of social and cultural events, have become a reality of authoritarian transformation. The tenor of attacks against the left was so radical that even centrist parties such as the Greens and SPD have been now proclaimed as left, with Hitler being a staunch leftist (a common refrain of AfD, and parts of the media).
In power, the CDU will be in a position to threaten to break up the coalition and, if necessary, take the AfD in as a coalition partner. We have Germany with an open rightward direction, with the CDU holding a grip over the West (38%) and the AfD in the East (38%, while each coming second in the other’s bulwark). We can expect further geopolitical radicalization (will Germany attempt to decouple from China?), more military spending, which will build on the pro-war climate, tax breaks for the few—the rich—and investment in mega-corporations.
Now let us speak briefly about the losers of these elections, as there are many: the SPD, headed by Chancellor Scholz, received its lowest ever result, at 16%, losing almost 10% of its vote. The Greens got only 11%, losing 4% of the vote as well. These results are a measure of the voters’ sense of disparity between these parties’ slogans and past positions and the reality of their promotion of war, anti-ecological, and anti-social stances; in short, of the denial of their very names and legacies. Resignation letters of the leadership would be the mere hygienic minimum of democracy, or at least renaming of their parties so they do not keep deceiving and disappointing their voters. The last member of the former coalition, FDP, the authoritarian neo-liberals who ran the finance ministry, were punished the hardest, as they did not even make it into Parliament, losing 10% of the vote! On the historical stage, the Ampel government has failed tremendously, and in this sense, the popular vote sent a clear message.
Another loser is Sahra Wagenknecht’s new party BSW (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht—Vernunft und Gerechtigkeit, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance—Reason and Justice), which missed the threshold by a mere 0.03%. Wagenknecht, a renegade of the Left Party, styled herself “beyond left and right” and represented a populist mixture, a little of this and a little of that. Her fraction did position itself against wars and against genocide, but it was her obsessive anti-migrant stance that cost her entry into the parliament. In January, her parliamentary faction joined the last vote on xenophobic legislation in the parliament together with the AfD and the CDU, which probably cost her a portion of leftist voters. Furthermore, the flirtation with Russia did not differentiate her much from the AfD. BSW’s central strategy to get votes from AfD failed miserably: BSW took the most votes from SPD, then from non-voters and Die Linke; it claimed relatively few AfD votes. The moment Wagenknecht moved away from left-wing social themes, she no longer had a credible position to put forward. At a time when Trump is symbolically promoting peace-making in some parts of the world—while in others he is mobilizing resources for war industry—a simple “pro-peace” message is hard-put to get any voter enthusiasm. After the initial enthusiasm of last autumn—polls showed around 10% after the regional elections in the Eastern countries—the BSW party fell below expectations.
The only ray of political hope of this electoral cycle can be seen in the rise of Die Linke, which was written off two months before the elections. Polling at 2–3%, it was even dropping out of the opinion polls, and after the defection of Sahra Wagenknecht and defeats in regional elections in the East last year, it was on the verge of collapse. As it is the only party that does not receive financial support from corporations, a good result in the elections is essential for its survival and for other political activities. At the end of the year, Die Linke made some great moves: with a change of leadership, the party was led by two charismatic and people-oriented candidates; its campaign was based on the old school door-to-door; it supported anti-fascist and pro-Palestinian struggles; and a lot more attention was given to social media. Die Linke was the only party that talked about social issues and tried to articulate the affects of discontent and anger through social justice, open anti-fascism, and anti-racism. A true fighting spirit for our times!
Die Linke won the youth vote (27% of voters under 25, and almost 20% under 30) and that of Berlin (20%), did very well in some of the bigger cities, and got 9% of the vote nationwide, almost doubling its vote (despite BSW, which took some of it away). Alongside AfD, Die Linke is also a “success story,” but with neither media nor government support. Its enthusiastic campaign will make it the only major critical parliamentary opposition; it will have more media access and resources, but will also have to remain active on the ground, committed to transformative ideals and policies, to renewing the party itself for a new generation. Neo-fascism is going to be on the march, and the center not only will not hold but will actively open the gates to it. In this respect, only a new left with a fighting spirit can offer any alternative. Rather than holding to its urban bunkers, a left party has to extend its strategy and address much broader geographies and demographics.
Gal Kirn is the author of the theoretically influential study The Partisan Counter-Archive: Retracing the Ruptures of Art and Memory in the Yugoslav People’s Liberation Struggle (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020). He holds a PhD in Intercultural Studies of Ideas. His research interest is grounded in the fields of political science, cultural analysis, and philosophy.
