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2024 Georgia Elections: Popular Support for Georgian Dream Amid Fraud Allegations

Polling station in Tbilisi, October 26, 2024.

Note from LeftEast editors: Between October and November of this year, four countries of the wider Black Sea region—Moldova and Georgia, Bulgaria and Romania—will have held elections with almost no left-wing alternatives on the ballot. With the following article, originally published in Jacobin, we open a series of analyses from the region that challenge the simplified coverage of these elections as merely a geopolitical and civilizational choice between Moscow and the West, leaving little space for domestic politics and for ordinary people’s lives and concerns.

On Saturday, October 26, Georgians went to the polls amid a tense atmosphere. A video began circulating of a man attempting to stuff multiple ballots while election observers tried to stop him. Dozens of people and cameras were present, and the footage quickly spread across local, international, and social media platforms. Additional videos of scuffles outside polling stations also gained wide attention, painting a picture of widespread violence and ballot-stuffing.

As voting ended, three exit polls appeared, each commissioned by different forces. The Edison poll, which favored the opposition, showed the various forces critical of the ruling Georgian Dream party total 51 percent of the vote — enough to form a government. They declared victory, with President Salome Zourabichvili — head of state, but today an opponent of the government — thanking the electorate for their political maturity and “Europeanity [sic].” Yet, the pro-government poll had the ruling party at 56 percent, and the other opposition poll put it at 41–42 percent. Both camps claimed victory, though at first Western media largely reported on the opposition’s supposed lead.

Message posted by Salome Zourabichvili on the social media platform X on October 26, 2024.

As the count progressed, Georgian Dream maintained a lead of over 50 percent, and President Zourabichvili suddenly fell silent. The opposition, which had been running parallel vote counts, stopped releasing their data. One by one, opposition parties declared the election had been rigged.

Observers

By Sunday, October 27, all eyes were on the international observers, as they prepared to release their findings. With over five hundred observers — including delegations from the EU Parliament, Council of Europe, and NATO — monitoring more than two thousand polling stations, their verdict carried weight. The joint observation mission’s report sharply criticized Georgian Dream, blaming the government for creating a toxic and polarized preelection environment. They highlighted controversial laws, such as the foreign influence law requiring NGOs and media to disclose foreign funding. Yet the observers did not declare the election itself had been rigged. They noted that incidents like the ballot-stuffing video were rare, with only one out of three thousand polling stations involved, and that it had been swiftly handled.

Additionally, they mentioned only a handful of double-voting attempts, which were prevented. Of the 1,924 observations, 6 percent were assessed negatively, citing issues like observer interference (16 percent), overcrowding (16 percent), improper use of secrecy sleeves (9 percent), incorrect polling station layout (8 percent), and visible ballot marks (6 percent). They stressed that the elections were generally well-administered and said they’d continue observing the post-election process for further complaints. Despite repeated questions from journalists, the observers refused to declare the election fraudulent, disappointing the opposition.

Later that evening, President Zourabichvili held a press conference flanked by three of the four signatories to her Charter, as the united opposition camp is known. She denounced the elections as “totally rigged,” likening their recognition to a Russian occupation, saying, “Russian elections were held.” She then retweeted a chart from an Twitter/X user attempting to prove fraud, with the caption “Cannot get any clearer,” offering no further explanation of the data. This chart raises suspicion over the pattern of Georgian Dream’s sky-high scores in rural areas.

Since then, Zourabichvili has mobilized her resources and contacts within Western governments and media, with a blitz of coverage to convince Western public opinion that Russia fixed the Georgian elections. Few journalists pressed her with tough questions. When asked for proof of Russian interference, she responded, “It’s very hard to demonstrate. No country, not even the United States or European nations, has been able to prove Russian interference in their elections.” Opposition spokespeople have used allegations like Russian- (or even Soviet-)style propaganda, anti-Western rhetoric, and fearmongering about war as part of their claims that the election was rigged. Zourabichvili suggested that Georgia, with fewer resources than the United States, shouldn’t be expected to provide proof either. Instead, she emphasized, “What’s important is what the Georgian population feels.”

Missing Votes?

But Zourabichvili’s claims also relied heavily on a rather faulty assumption. She argued that the elections simply must have been rigged because opinion polls have consistently shown that Georgians want EU integration, yet the election results favored Georgian Dream. If voters want to join the EU, why vote for this party? The truth is a little more complicated. For Georgian Dream, which made the bid for EU membership part of the national constitution in 2018, also promises to pursue this same goal, and their campaign in this election even widely used the EU flag.

What the president disputes is this compatibility. She gloats about her access to the Western heads of government who refuse to meet with Georgian Dream — so, she upholds the EU leadership’s approved version of pro-Europeanness, and anything else is straightforwardly “pro-Russian.” This Manichean picture is also apparent in her citing of the large protests in March against the NGO law, mostly in Tbilisi. She asked, “Where are those thousands of people now? Did they disappear?” — implying that the protests included the entire population, which ought to have been mirrored in the election results.

She frequently reiterated claims of ballot-stuffing, double-voting, and election rigging without providing specifics on the scale or proof of these allegations. Having earlier reassured the public that Georgia’s first use of electronic voting was secure, she now claimed it had been used to manipulate the results. At a protest she called for the Monday after the elections, Zourabichvili announced that they would use the time to gather evidence of election rigging for their Western allies. Meanwhile, Zourabichvili, formerly French ambassador to Georgia, leveraged her connections to urge Western governments to withhold recognition of the election results until she could provide proof of “total” rigging.

Other opposition members echoed her calls, with some demanding a new election overseen entirely by foreign supervisors and vowing to boycott parliament until that happened. Some opposition leaders claimed they had stayed up all night after the election trying to figure out how the votes were rigged, while others admitted they still needed time to gather evidence. We are still waiting for concrete proof. There are indeed competing theories about what kind of rigging took place — with some suggesting it would be better to choose one lead and work to generate the evidence of that one in particular.

Repeat Vote

By the official count, Georgian Dream secured 54 percent of the vote, with strong support in the regions. The opposition performed poorly across the country, with their only stronghold being in Tbilisi. If some critics of the government half-heartedly agreed that Georgian Dream really did do better than expected, they are still looking for answers outside of themselves.

While Georgian Dream competed on its own, the opposition was a coalition of four informally aligned parties and alliances. They had signed on to a “Georgian Charter,” devised by President Zourabichvili. Although she was elected with Georgian Dream’s support in 2018, she has since turned against the government.

The Charter demanded that any signatory party would agree to let Zourabichvili form the next government if they won, giving her the sole authority to handpick the prime minister. Her term as president is ending, and she was neither on any party list nor on the ballot for these elections. Despite not officially participating in the election, she maintained a key role in the political direction of the opposition through this arrangement, calling it an example of “European democracy.”

The Charter also laid out plans for a technical government formed by the opposition, whose main task would be to reverse laws the EU had criticized and pass legislation necessary for EU integration. After these changes, the plan was to hold “free” elections under the new legal framework. On its own, each of the opposition parties claimed not much more than 10 percent.

Western Pressure

NATO and European observers noted the “polarized” atmosphere around the elections and accusations of Russian propaganda. Naturally they said nothing about EU or US efforts to influence Georgian politics, with strong actions in recent years responding to democratic backsliding and anti-Western rhetoric. Domestic laws, like the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence and anti-LGBT propaganda laws, sparked their ire. The EU has halted Georgia’s admission process, while both the EU and United States have suspended millions in financial aid.

This approach also includes sanctioning individuals in Georgia, where political figures have been sanctioned and visa restrictions are in place for those allegedly undermining Georgian democracy. The Biden administration has launched a review of US-Georgia relations, warning that more restrictions could come if Georgia stays on its current path.

What is this path? The EU Parliament’s 2024 resolutions against Georgian Dream were harsh, expressing strong disapproval of the government’s actions. These resolutions went beyond mere censure; they called for severe measures rarely seen in diplomacy, especially toward a nation seeking EU membership (if sometimes practiced on the EU’s own members). The European Union threatened to withhold support from the Georgian government, demanding that all EU assistance be halted until the government repealed the authoritarian laws it had enacted.

The decisions called for personal sanctions against Bidzina Ivanishvili, the billionaire behind Georgian Dream, and other officials. The language was blunt; Ivanishvili was labeled the figure behind the administration and directly tied to the Kremlin. The EU Parliament accused Georgia’s leaders of turning the country into a Russian satellite state with the foreign influence law, linking it to similar legislation passed in Russia in 2012. The parliament was not just urging reform; it warned that if Georgians did not vote against Georgian Dream, the country might never join the EU.

The US embassy in Georgia posted pointed warnings on Facebook about the danger of isolation. To add to the turmoil, during the UN General Assembly in New York, Georgia’s prime minister was invited to Joe Biden’s welcome ceremony but then denied permission to attend. The UK recently suspended its annual security dialogue with Georgia and canceled further defense talks.

While the West pressures Georgia with sanctions, relations with Russia remain complicated, in the aftermath of the 2008 war between the two countries. Visa restrictions have now been lifted, and Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has signaled a willingness to address the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, currently recognized as “independent” by Russia. A compromise might include the withdrawal of Russian soldiers from certain areas. Russia has also cut off assistance to Abkhazia, which relies heavily on it, and removed the region’s discounted energy tariffs. They have embraced the statements and laws put forth by Georgian Dream.

In an attempt to show goodwill to the Ossetians, Georgian Dream has offered gestures of apology and called for the previous government, responsible for crimes against them, to face trial. They heavy-handedly dubbed these proceedings the “Nuremberg trials.” Still, framing the elections as a choice between war and peace probably did help boost Georgian Dream’s vote. In power since 2012, it is the only Georgian government since the fall of the USSR that hasn’t been at war. It presents itself as the party of stability — using Ukraine as the counterexample, representing the future they seek to avoid.

Georgian Dream claims to be pro-Europe, with the message “With dignity to Europe.” This is, however, something different to the dominant pro-European stance upheld by Georgian liberals, and is aligned with more conservative forces in the EU itself. The promise is to join Europe eventually, while also playing it safe at the crossroads of powerful, conflicting nations during this unstable time in regional and world geopolitics.

Did Georgian Dream Win more Votes?

The opposition claimed ahead of the vote that they expected Georgian Dream to rig the elections — yet they were confident enough that they would win regardless. After the votes came in, they accused Georgian Dream of being greedy, alleging that it overshot its rigging by claiming 54 percent of the vote, up from 48 percent in 2020. They suggested that it increasing its support is a mere impossibility.

In 2020, the electoral system included both proportional and majoritarian voting, while 2024 marked the first election with only proportional voting and the introduction of electronic voting. Under the majoritarian system, candidates had to campaign locally, standing as individual candidates rather than relying solely on party leadership from Tbilisi.

In 2020, Georgian Dream’s majoritarian local candidates in all regional districts outside the capital received between 43 and 69 percent of the votes. With the shift to a fully proportional system in 2024, it became more challenging to predict how the votes would ultimately play out. It would not be correct to only compare with the 48 percent figure of the 2020 proportional vote, without taking the majoritarian vote percentages into account.

The opposition parties focused on the cities, while Georgian Dream, despite enjoying incumbent advantages and not facing countercampaigning in rural areas, clearly rallied a big vote in these regions. Analysts and polls both suggested that a message centered on geopolitics was unlikely to resonate with the 70 percent of Georgians living outside the capital, Tbilisi, who tend to be more concerned with day-to-day quality-of-life issues.

Most importantly, the world has changed dramatically since 2020 with the pandemic and then the war in Ukraine. Russia’s invasion has significantly altered political dynamics everywhere, but this is particularly true in Georgia, where memories of the 2008 war and the conflicts of the 1990s are still fresh. Georgian Dream campaigned hard on a “peace” message, warning that there were forces attempting to drag Georgians into war. The ongoing war in Ukraine, along with Israel’s attacks across the Middle East and the potential for war in Iran, has left many Georgians fearful.

President Zourabichvili argued that while her campaign sought to speak to voters’ desires, Georgian Dream relied on their “fears,” by this suggesting to Western media that her approach would surely deliver victory. Yet many Georgians are indeed more motivated by anxiety: concerned not to lose what they have, rather than trust in promises of European prosperity that haven’t delivered for them yet.

But in this context, Georgia has effectively leveraged its geographical position. Not fully complying with sanctions against Russia has evidently helped boost its economy. By maintaining a neutral stance, Georgia has emerged as a vital trade hub for countries looking to engage with Russia, resulting in an increase in business activity, particularly in logistics and trade. Projected GDP growth is 7.1 percent. As a result, Georgia’s inflation rate has decreased markedly to 0.6 percent since 2022, improving purchasing power.

Georgian Dream is a neoliberal and billionaire-backed party, yet recently has offered some modest steps forward compared to the previous ten years of rule — and significantly more progressive on social issues than the previous government. They also established a minimum wage for health care workers and doubled maternity pay in 2023. The last general minimum wage had been passed in 1999. Although these changes may not be substantial, they highlight a shift in government priorities.

Some of the reasons for Georgian Dream’s popularity jar with liberal optimism about Georgians’ embrace of “European values,” or indeed what those values really are. Indeed, the ruling party has strategically used prevailing anti-LGBT sentiments to expand its voter base. In Georgia’s conservative society, the party’s messaging around “traditional European values” resonates deeply. According to a 2021 UN study, 55.9 percent of Georgians viewed LGBT issues as “propaganda,” a decrease of 20 percent since 2016, yet opposition remained strong, with support rising only modestly from 13.6 percent to 19.7 percent. Support for same-sex marriage also remains low, with only 10 percent expressing any level of acceptance. Over the past three years, conservative groups not affiliated with Georgian Dream have intensified their anti-LGBT rhetoric, priming this voter base to ultimately align with Georgian Dream at the polls.

In addition to other challenges, Georgia is experiencing a culture war. Many of those who lost out in the transition from the Soviet Union to a capitalist wild West — and especially those who haven’t benefited from Western grants or support — also don’t speak English or hold degrees from European universities. When these individuals from rural areas come to Tbilisi for “Family Day,” a Christian festival made for traditional ideas of families, demonstrations or Georgian Dream rallies, the urban opposition often derides them as “backward.” This criticism targets not only their cultural preferences, like Russian music, but also their hygiene, clothing, food taste, and lifestyle, deepening the social and cultural rift between these groups. Most people in the rural areas don’t attend the demonstrations in Tbilisi. But they hear what the opposition and their supporters in the capital say about people like them.

While the opposition, along with Western observers and politicians, has focused on how the foreign influence law impacts Western-funded, “astroturfed” civil society and a polarized political environment, they’ve overlooked its appeal to Georgian Dream’s voter base. The opposition was big, but surely did not mobilize the entire society. Polling showed that 35 percent of Georgians disapproved of the law, 30 percent approved, and the rest were indifferent. By targeting the more privileged segments of society — often derisively called “grant-eaters” — this law may have energized Georgian Dream supporters who feel marginalized and excluded from such benefits to go vote.

The “foreign influence” law, which was frequently cited as a cause of the “hostile environment” in the run-up to the election, has not yet led to any fines for NGOs missing reporting deadlines. Despite claims by opposition NGOs that it would hinder their election monitoring, the actual law has had no immediate impact so far on their operations, though some claim the fears around the law have had an impact. If this vote was supposed to be a referendum on these laws, it does not seem that most Georgians’ main concern at the election was indeed to overturn them. Yet, calls to repeal them remained urgent. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, without explicitly recognizing the election outcome, remarked, “The Georgian people embraced democracy yesterday” and called for authorities to “repeal legislation that fundamentally undermines fundamental freedoms.”

What’s Next?

In the aftermath of the election, the opposition is aiming to build a case to declare the elections wholly fraudulent, with Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán alone among Western leaders currently recognizing the results. By pressuring the West to question the election’s legitimacy, Zourabichvili is helping to buy the opposition time to construct and present its case to foreign allies. Her repeated warnings of a “Russian takeover” are part of this effort, encouraging Western governments to maintain pressure on the Georgian Dream government.

If Western leaders ultimately do not recognize the election, a major standoff could ensue. Calls for the “Georgian people to be heard” will listen to only one part of it. The opposition remains a fragile coalition, lacking the cohesive force to overpower Georgian Dream alone, but clearly unwilling to accept that this party can legitimately govern.

This raises complex questions: Would foreign powers attempt to remove Georgian Dream, and what recourse does the opposition really have? While some Western nations might favor significant intervention, there’s little public appetite in Georgia for a “Maidan-style” upheaval. This impasse could bring Georgia to a point of reckoning, challenging the country’s stability and unleashing chaos.

Sopo Japaridze is the chair of Solidarity Network, an independent care workers union in Georgia. She has been a labor organizer for over a decade. She researches and studies labor and social relations and writes for various publications. She also co-founded the Soviet Georgia history initiative and podcast, Reimagining Soviet Georgia.